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CASENOTES
ANTITRUST - CLAYTON ACT SECTION 4 - STANDING -
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT ONLY DIRECT PURCHASERS
HAVE STANDING TO BRING TREBLE DAMAGE SUIT UNDER
SECTION 4 OF CLAYTON ACT. ILLINOIS BRICK CO. v.
ILLINOIS, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 9, 1977, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,' the United
States Supreme Court denied indirect purchasers 2 the right to
recover damages from manufacturers or producers who have
engaged in illegal price-fixing. The Court held that, as a general
rule,3 only direct purchasers may bring a treble damage suit under
section 4 of the Clayton Act,4 thereby severely restricting the
potential scope of liability for antitrust violators. Three days after
the decision the response of American corporations to Illinois Brick
was exemplified in Exxon Corporation's announcement that it would
no longer sell its fuel products directly to consumers, but rather only
through distributors. 5 It is apparent that American corporations
may now use Illinois Brick as a shield to place themselves beyond
the reach of consumer treble-damage suits simply by selling their
products through distributors.
Prior to the Illinois Brick decision, the treble-damage suit had
increasingly become "one of the surest weapons for effective
enforcement of the antitrust laws," 6 which were referred to in 1933
by Chief Justice Hughes as a "charter of freedom." 7 Since' 1960, the
number of private antitrust suits filed in the United States District
Courts has more than trebled in volume.8 Between 1970 and 1975
civil antitrust actions rose 54 percent, 9 and by the close of the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1977, increased a further 14.6 percent. 10 Of the
1. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
2. For the purposes of this Casenote a direct purchaser is defined as one who
purchases directly from a manufacturer or other producer. An indirect purchaser
is one who purchases from a middleman.
3. The Court recognized two narrow exceptions to its holding. The first exception is
where the direct purchaser has a pre-existing cost-plus contract with the indirect
purchaser. 431 U.S. at 735-36. The second exception to the general prohibition of
the use of the pass-on theory by an indirect purchaser arises when "the direct
purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer." Id. at 736 n.16. See Stotter &
Co. v. Amstar Corp., 46 U.S.L.W. 2503 (3d Cir. April 4, 1978). See generally 56 N.
CAR. L. REV. 341, 347-48 (1978).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
5. Petition for Rehearing at 7, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
6. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311,
318 (1965).
7. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933).
8. 1976 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Ann. Rep. 124.
9. Id. at 125.
10. 1977 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Ann. Rep. 99.
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1,689 antitrust suits filed during fiscal year 1977,11 private antitrust
cases totaled 1,611,12 or approximately 52 times the number of
criminal antitrust cases filed. 13 The disproportionately low number
of criminal filings indicates that the treble damage action is an
indispensable supplement to government enforcement of the anti-
trust laws. 14 As one legal commentator has observed, "the private
antitrust suit is a curious combination of public regulatory and
private compensatory law."15 The restrictions imposed upon indirect
purchasers by Illinois Brick will certainly result in a curtailment of
the treble-damage remedy as an effective mechanism for enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws and private redress for antitrust
violations.
II. PRIVATE SUITS UNDER THE CLAYTON ACT
Private-antitrust suits are authorized by section 4 of the Clayton
Act, which provides in pertinent part: "Any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover three-
fold damages by him sustained."'1 6 Thus, in order to maintain a
cause of action under section 4, a person 1 7 must show (1) a violation
of the antitrust laws, (2) an injury1 8 to his "business or property,"' 19
and (3) a causal connection between the violation and the injury. 2°
11. Id. These filings were the highest number recorded in seventeen years, except for
1962 when 1,739 of the 2,039 cases filed involved the electrical equipment
industry. Id.
12. Id. at A-17 (Table C-3).
13. Author's calculations.
14. See In re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. Sec. & Antitrust Litigation, 387 F.
Supp. 906, 908 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See generally Wham, Antitrust Treble-Damage
Suits: The Government's Chief Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954).
15. Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis Of Developments
In The Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1011 (1952).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). The purpose of the treble damage provision was to create a
force of "private attorneys general" to enforce the antitrust laws. Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). In addition to the treble
damage remedy, injunctive relief is authorized by § 16 of the Clayton Act. 15
U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
17. The Supreme Court has recently held that a foreign nation is a person within the
meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act, and thus is entitled to sue for treble damages
under the antitrust laws when it has been injured in its business or property.
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 98 S. Ct. 584 (1978).
18. A person who, because of price-fixing, pays more for a product is deemed to be
injured in his business or property. See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906).
19. "Business or property" means commercial interests or enterprises. Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972). Compare Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 435 F. Supp. 933, 935-37 (D. Minn. 1977) with Weinberg v. Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 880, 881-85 (N.D. Cal. 1977) and Gutierrez v. E. & J.
Gallo Winery Co., 425 F. Supp. 1221, 1222-26 (N.D. Cal. 1977). For a discussion of
the "business or property" requirement, see generally Blackford, "Business Or
Property" Entitled To Protection Under Section 4 Of The Clayton Act, 26
MERCER L. REV. 737 (1975).
20. See generally Monroe, Alternative Courses of Action Available To Persons
Injured Under The Antitrust Laws, 34 OHIO STATE L.J. 465 (1973).
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Despite the apparent simplicity of the language of section 4, the
federal courts have labored over the "injury" and "causation"
requirements in ascertaining whether a particular litigant has a
justiciable claim. This has been an attempt to balance the value of
private antitrust enforcement against the dangers of multiple
liability, excessive litigation, and consequential claims.21 Out of
these labors, two basic standards have developed to determine
whether a plaintiff is within the scope of section 4, and thus has
standing to sue.22 These standards have been labeled as the "direct-
injury" and "target area" tests. 23 The tests employ different
analytical techniques.2 4 Under the "direct-injury" approach, the
courts focus on the relationship between the plaintiff and the alleged
antitrust violator. Under the "target area" test, the courts focus on
the plaintiffs relationship to the area of the economy allegedly
injured by the offender.
A. "Direct-Injury" Test
The "direct-injury" test was first formulated in 1910 in Loeb v.
Eastman Kodak Co.25 Loeb, a stockholder and unsecured creditor of
a corporation, brought a treble damage suit alleging that the
defendant, by means of an illegal monopoly, destroyed the business
of the corporation thereby causing him to suffer a total loss on his
stock investment and creditor claims. In holding that the plaintiff
lacked standing to sue, the court reasoned that "the injury
complained of was directed at the corporation and not the individual
stockholder. Hence any injury which he received . . . was indirect,
remote and consequential. '26 The rationale underlying the Loeb
decision was that court's fear of a possible multiplicity of suits
brought by other creditors of the corporation. 2 7
Subsequent decisions employing the "direct-injury" test have
interpretated Loeb to deny standing to plaintiffs who did not have
direct contractual or competitive relations with the antitrust
offender.28 In effect, these courts have imposed a privity require-
21. Comment, Mangano And Ultimate-Consumer Standing: The Misuse Of The
Hanover Doctrine, 72.COLUM. L. REV. 394, 397 (1972).
22. The question of standing to sue evolved from the "case or controversy"
requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution. See generally Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
23. See generally Note, Standing To Sue In Private Antitrust Litigation: Circuits In
Conflict, 10 I.NDIANA L. REV. 532 (1977).
24. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 126 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Morgan v. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
25. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
26. Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. E.g., Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 974 (1971) (shareholder of corporation denied standing to sue for loss
resulting from injury to corporation); SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407
F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969) (licensor of patent lacked
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ment.29 This restrictive interpretation of standing to sue prevailed
for some forty-five years.
B. "Target Area" Test
In 1955, a more equitable and flexible test of standing to sue,
labeled the "target area" test, was conceived, which came to be
adopted by the majority of the lower federal courts. Under the
"target area" test, the courts focus on whether the plaintiff was
"within that area of the economy which is endangered by a
breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry." 30 The
test is "essentially a measure of remoteness of injury resulting from
antitrust violations. '31
The leading case defining the "target area" test is Karseal Corp.
v. Richfield Oil Corp.32 In Karseal, the plaintiff manufactured a car
polish, which it sold to enfranchised regional distributors, who in
turn re-sold to independent gas stations. Defendant Richfield entered
into exclusive dealings contracts with approximately 2,965 service
station operators that restricted them from purchasing any products
other than those designated by Richfield. As a result, Karseal's
distributors were unable to sell to these stations. Although the
distributors suffered a "direct" injury, Karseal brought a treble-
damages suit against Richfield, alleging that Karseal's sales of
polish to its "distributors were and have been substantially
diminished with the ... proximate result that plaintiff has
sustained damage to its business and property." 33 In holding that
Karseal had standing to sue, the court found a causal relationship
between the alleged injury and the antitrust violation, stating:
To say to a manufacturer of wax that he may have the
protection of the antitrust laws in private litigation if he
hires salesmen for his product, and not have such protection
if he decides to contract with a distributor, would be an
unequal application of the law ....
We conclude that Karseal... is "within that area of the
economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competi-
standing where royalty losses caused by injury to licensee); Volasco Prods. Co. v.
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907
(1963) (suppliers denied standing when their distributors directly injured);
Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1956) (lessor of lessee
whose business was injured lacking standing although rent based on a
percentage of lessee's receipts); Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952) (partner in injured partnership denied standing).
29. Pollock, Standing To Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-On Doctrine, 32
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L. J. 5, 14 (1966).
30. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
31. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 435 F. Supp. 933, 935 (D. Minn. 1977).
32. 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
33. Id. at 361.
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tive conditions in a particular industry;" . . .that Karseal
was within the target area of the illegal practices of
Richfield; that Karseal was not only hit, but was aimed at,
by Richfield. 34
Nine years later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals developed
the "target area" test further by incorporating a "foreseeability"
concept. In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn,35 the
court stated that under the "target area" test, the "plaintiff must
show that, whether or not then known to the conspirators, plaintiffs
affected operation was actually in the area which it could reasonably
be foreseen would be affected by the conspiracy. '3 6 Although
"foreseeability" has not been uniformly accepted by courts which
have applied the "target area" test,3 7 this approach is consistent
with the Supreme Court's policy mandate that the "purposes of the
antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will
be an everpresent threat to deter anyone contemplating business
behavior in violation of the antitrust laws." 3
34. Id. at 364-65.
35. 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964).
36. Id, at 220.
37. See Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). Although the Second Circuit
has adopted the rubric of the "target area" test, it has rejected the foreseeability
formula in determining standing to sue. Instead, the court strictly follows the
language of Karseal, see text accompanying note 32 supra, and looks to whether
the plaintiff was "aimed at" by the alleged antitrust violator. Id. As a result, the
second and ninth circuits, while employing the "target area" test, have reached
different conclusions on the determination of standing in cases involving similar
fact situations. Compare Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d 1073
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971), with Fields Productions, Inc. v.
United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 432 F.2d
1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971). For discussion of "target
area" test as applied by the second circuit, see Note, Standing To Sue In Private
Antitrust Litigation: Circuits In Conflict, 10 INDIANA L. REv. 532, 536-38 (1977).
38. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
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The courts of appeals for the first,39 second,40 fourth, 41 fifth,42
seventh,43 eighth,44 and ninth 45 circuits have generally applied the
"target area" test to determine standing, although at times their
analytical processes are unclear.46 The third47 and tenth 48 circuits
employ the "direct-injury" test. The sixth circuit has rejected both
tests in favor of more liberal standing requirements. 4 9
39. See, e.g., Carroll v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1975)
(although Carroll court did not pass on issue of standing, it indicated, in dictum,
that "target area" test is proper approach). But see Miley v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 242 F.2d 758(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe
Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956).
40. E.g., Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union of America, 553 F.2d
793, 801 (2d Cir. 1977); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 521
F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Calderone Enterprises
Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
41. E.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Products, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Midway Enterprises, Inc. v. Petroleum
Mkg. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Md. 1974).
42. E.g., Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir.
1976); Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967).
43. E.g., Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957); General
Beverage Sales Co.-Oshkosh v. East Side Winery, 396 F. Supp. 590, 596 (E.D. Wis.
1975).
44. E.g., Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (8th
Cir. 1966).
45. Blackenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Morgan v. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc., 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964);
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
46. For example, one district court opinion explained the "target area" test in the
following language:
[SItanding to sue under Section 4 is strictly limited to those individuals
who have been directly injured by the alleged violation of the antitrust
laws. This is known as the "target area" doctrine.
Under the "target area" doctrine, it is not necessary to find that
plaintiff is in direct competition with defendants, or that there is a direct
contractual relationship between them . . . nor under that doctrine is it
necessary to prove that it must have been one of defendants' purposes to
injure this particular plaintiff.
Johnson v. Ready Mix Concrete Co., 318 F. Supp. 930, 932 (D. Neb. 1970)
(citations omitted; emphasis in original).
47. E.g., Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935(1976); Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 974 (1971); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). But cf.
Drysdale v. Florida Team Tennis, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 843, 847-48 (W.D. Pa. 1976)(holding, under both "direct-injury" and "target area" tests, that professional
tennis player had standing to sue under § 4 of Clayton Act).
48. E.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 938 (1973).
49. In Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975), the sixth circuit
applied the general standing test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
Under this test the plaintiff must show (1) injury in fact and (2) that he was
within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute. 397 U.S. at 152-53.
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Although the Supreme Court has not yet had occasion directly to
consider either the "direct-injury" or "target area" tests, it has
consistently reiterated that the private antitrust remedies should be
afforded a liberal interpretation, and until Illinois Brick had
consistently rejected attempts to limit the standing of private
litigants to sue under the antitrust laws.50 For example, in Radovich
v. National Football League,51 the Court stated:
Congress has, by legislative flat, determined that such
prohibited activities are injurious to the public and has
provided sanctions allowing private enforcement of the
antitrust laws by an aggrieved party .... In the face of
such a policy this Court should not add requirements to
burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set
forth by Congress in those laws.5 2
C. Hanover Shoe
In 1968, the Court further encouraged private antitrust en-
forcement by its decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Co.,53 ruling that an antitrust defendant could not assert
as a defense that the plaintiff-claimant had passed-on illegal
overcharges to its customers. Hanover Shoe involved a treble-
damage suit brought against a shoe machinery manufacturer by a
shoe manufacturer. The plaintiff alleged that United had monopol-
ized the shoe industry, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act,5 4
by leasing but refusing to sell its shoe machinery.5 5 Plaintiff sought
to recover damages incurred by the leasing arrangement based upon
"the difference between what it paid United in shoe machine rentals
and what it would have paid had United been willing . . . to sell
those machines."5 6 As a defense, United contended that the plaintiff
had suffered no legally cognizable injury because it had passed on
the illegal overcharges to its customers in the form of increased
prices for its shoes.57 The Court rejected United's passing-on defense,
holding:
[W]hen a buyer shows that the price paid by him for
materials purchased for use in his business is illegally high
50. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. People Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
(1961); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
51. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
52. Id. at 453-54 (footnote omitted).
53. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
54. 15 U.S.C. §2 (1976).
55. The district court found that Hanover would have purchased the shoe machinery
from United had it been given the opportunity to do so. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487 (1968).
56. Id. at 484.
57. Id. at 487-88.
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and also shows the amount of the overcharge, he has made
out a prima facie case of injury and damage within the
meaning of § 4.
... [T]he buyer is equally entitled to damages if he
raised the price for his own product. As long as the seller
continues to charge the illegal price, he takes from the buyer
more than the law allows. At whatever price the buyer sells,
the price he pays the seller remains illegally high.58
The underlying rationale of the Hanover Shoe ruling was
twofold. First, the Court emphasized that the peculiarly complicated
factual context of the passing-on defense asserted by United would
present "insurmountable" difficulties of proof which would "require
additional long and complicated proceedings involving massive
evidence and complicated theories." 59 In short, the Court's belief that
it would be virtually impossible for United to demonstrate the
passing on and accordingly show damage to the plaintiff's
customers evidenced a concern for judicial economy and efficiency.
As a subsequent lower court decision framed the problem facing the
Hanover Shoe Court:
In effect, United Shoe was asking the trial court to
determine that overpayments on machine leases had been
converted into price increases on shoes. In other words, the
court would have had to speculate as to the effect on an
illegally inflated portion of plaintiffs overhead costs on the
price of plaintiff's own manufactured product, which is
affected not only by overhead costs, but also by competition
in separate wholesale and retail markets.6°
Second, the Hanover Shoe decision stressed the need to preserve
the private antitrust remedy as an effective mechanism of enforcing
the antitrust laws. The Court reasoned that recognition of United's
passing-on defense would, in effect, allow United to retain the fruits
of its illegality because no one would be available to bring suit
against it:
[I]f buyers are subjected to the passing-on defense, those
who buy from them would also have to meet the challenge
that they passed on the higher price to their customers.
These ultimate consumers, in today's case the buyers of
single pairs of shoes, would have only a tiny stake in a
lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action. In
consequence, those who violate the antitrust laws by price
fixing or monopolizing would retain the fruits of their
illegality because no one was available who would bring suit
58. Id. at 489.
59. Id. at 492-93.
60. Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 594 (N.D. 11. 1973).
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against them. Treble-damage actions, the importance of
which the Court has many times emphasized, would be
substantially reduced in effectiveness. 61
Hanover Shoe concerned the right of direct purchasers to recover
treble damages. At no point in its decision, however, did the Hanover
Shoe Court indicate that the presence of intermediaries would
operate as a bar to recovery by indirect purchasers. In fact, the Court
recognized the right of indirect purchasers to sue for injuries caused
by antitrust violations when it reasoned, in support of its rejection of
United's passing-on defense, that the interests of the indirect
purchasers in Hanover, the buyers of single pairs of shoes, were de
minimus, and hence they would be unlikely to sue.62
The Hanover Shoe decision was a pragmatic one. Its dual
purpose was primarily to protect the courts from protracted
litigation where the question of proof of passing-on would, at best, be
highly speculative, and secondarily to encourage rather than limit
private antitrust enforcement.63 It noted, without suggesting a
solution, the problems of proof attendant to passing-on claims.
The decision can hardly be viewed as a blanket prohibition of
the defensive use of passing-on. In concluding its analysis of
United's asserted pass-on defense, the Court recognized that there
were situations where the defense could be raised. The Court stated
that the use of the pass-on defense would be permitted when the
overcharged buyer had a pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract which
made it easy to prove that he had not been damaged. 64 When viewed
in this light, it is apparent that the Hanover Shoe decision was
rooted in the problems of proof which the pass-on defense presented.
A subsequent lower court decision aptly pointed out that "[tihe
thrust of Hanover Shoe is not the destruction of the passing-on
defense but its restriction to situations which are easily provable. '65
D. Post-Hanover Shoe Decisions
In Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp.,66 indirect purchasers brought treble-
61. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968)
(emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 489. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
63. One legal commentator has suggested that the reasons .offered by the Hanover
Court for rejecting United's passing-on defense were interrelated: "the Court's
emphasis on the problems of proof reflected its concern that the attempt to
establish a pass-on would so bog down the litigation process as to undermine the
efficacy of the private enforcement mechanism." Comment, Mangano And
Ultimate-Consumer Standing: The Misuse Of The Hanover Doctrine. 72 COLUM.
L. REv. 394, 408 (1972).
64. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
65. Obron v. Union Camp Corp., 355 F. Supp. 902, 907 (E.D. Mich. 1972), affd, 477
F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1973).
66. 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nor. Mangano v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971). See generally Comment,
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damages suits against manufacturers of plumbing fixtures to
recover damages for illegal overcharges caused by the defendants'
conspiracy to fix prices of certain plumbing fixtures. The district
court held that the plaintiffs' failure to answer interrogatories
justified dismissal of the action.6 7 The district court, however, was
anxious to reach the substantive questions involved in the case and,
relying on Hanover Shoe, held that the plaintiffs' claims could be
dismissed on alternative grounds of "insurmountable difficulties of
proof. '68 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds
that "it was within the district court's sound discretion to dismiss
the actions . . . solely for inexcusable failure to answer interrogato-
ries. ' '6 9 In dictum, it also agreed with the district court's interpreta-
tion of Hanover Shoe.70
Nonetheless, the trend of lower federal court decisions following
Hanover Shoe was clearly in the direction of permitting offensive
use of the pass-on principle by indirect purchasers. 7 1 The bellweather
case is In Re Master Key Antitrust Litigation72 Master Key involved
a treble damage suit brought against manufacturers of hardware by
government plaintiffs who purchased indirectly through building
contractors hardware components used on doors of buildings. The
plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturers had engaged in a price-
fixing conspiracy which resulted in illegal overcharges, and that the
illegal overcharges had been passed on to them in the price they had
to pay to purchase the buildings. In denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the district court held that the rejection of the
passing-on defense in Hanover Shoe did not preclude the offensive
use of passing on by indirect purchasers in attempting to prove their
damages. The court reasoned that the defendant's interpretation of
Mangano And Ultimate-Consumer Standing: The Misuse Of The Hanover
Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 394, 404-414 (1972) (general criticism of district
court's decision in Mangano).
67. Id. at 18-19.
68. Id.
69. 438 F.2d at 1188.
70. Id.
71. See Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir.
1976); Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom.
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); In re Western Liquid Asphalt
Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Lefrak v. Arabian American Oil Co., 405 F. Supp.
597 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Carnivale Bag Co., Inc. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp.
287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill.
1973); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1973-2] Trade Cases (CCH)
74,680 (D. Conn. 1973); Southern General Builders, Inc. v. Maule Industries,
Inc., [1973-1] Trade Cases (CCH) 74,484 (S.D. Fla. 1972); cf. West Virginia v.
Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), ,-ert. denied sub nom. Cotler Drugs,
Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (holding indirect purchasers, retail
consumers of antibiotic drugs, entitled to participate in settlement against drug
manufacturer). Contra, Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'g Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
72. [1973-2] Trade Cases (CCH) 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973).
19781 337
Baltimore Law Review
Hanover Shoe, as denying indirect purchasers the right to sue for
antitrust violations, was erroneous. It commented that "the attempt
to transform a rejection of a defense because it unduly hampers
antitrust enforcement into a reason for a complete refusal to
entertain the claims of a certain class of plaintiffs seems an
ingenious attempt to turn the decision and its underlying rationale
on its head." 73
A year after Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court in Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.7 4 reaffirmed the need to lower the
antitrust plaintiffs burden of proof in order to prevent an antitrust
violator from escaping liability merely because of the difficulty in
ascertaining the precise measure of damages which he had caused.
The Court instructed lower courts to "observe the practical limits of
the burden of proof which may be demanded of a treble-damage
plaintiff. . .; damage issues in these cases are rarely susceptible of
the kind of concrete, detailed proof of injury which is available in
other contexts." 75
In the same Term, the Court also decided Perkins v. Standard
Oil Company of California,76 a treble damage suit involving injuries
allegedly resulting from defendant's price discriminations in the sale
of gasoline and oil in violation of section 2 of the Clayton Act. 77 The
Court there held that a claimant can recover damages for an
antitrust violation "regardless of the 'level' in the chain of
distribution on which the injury occurs," provided he can show "a
causal connection between the price discrimination . . . and the
injury suffered.17 8 As to the question of damages, the Court went on
to say that the ultimate conclusion as to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support an inference of causation is for the jury to
determine.7 9
In Perkins, the "direct injury" approach to section 4 of the
Clayton Act was implicitly undermined, if not rejected, by the Court.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had concluded that "fourth
level" price discrimination was not proscribed by section 2 of the
Clayton Act, focusing on the indirect commercial relationship
between the claimant and the defendant.80 In reversing, Justice
Black, speaking for the Court, admonished the court of appeals that
the direct-indirect "limitation is wholly artificial and is unwarranted
by the language or purpose of the Act."8 1 Justice Black reasoned that
73. Id. at 94,978-79.
74. 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
75. Id. at 123.
76. 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
78. Perkins v. Standard Oil of Cal., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969).
79. Id.
80. 396 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
81. 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969).
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"the competitive harm done . . .is certainly no less because of the
presence of an additional link in this particular distribution chain
from the producer to the retailer,"8 2 and reversal was grounded on a




In 1975, the State of Illinois and seven hundred local govern-
ment entities brought a treble damage suit against eleven concrete
manufacturers in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
conspired to fix the prices of concrete block in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act,8 4 resulting in illegal overcharges to the
plaintiffs.8 5 Only four of the plaintiffs purchased the blocks directly
from the defendants. 86 The remaining plaintiffs were indirect
purchasers, most of whom had purchased from contractors through
competitive bid awards.8 7
At the trial level, defendants moved for summary judgment 88
against all plaintiffs who were not direct purchasers, contending
that, as a matter of law, they lacked standing to sue because they
were indirect purchasers.8 9 In support of their motion, defendants
relied on Hanover Shoe ° Defendants argued that the Hanover Shoe
rationale applies not only as a limitation on the use of the pass-on
defense by an antitrust violator against a direct purchaser's claim
but, conversely, also prohibited the indirect purchaser from using the
pass-on offensively against the alleged antitrust violator.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 649. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d
122, 129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Morgan v. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc., 414
U.S. 1045 (1973); text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
85. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461, 463 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d
1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977). Plaintiffs alleged that the overcharges passed on to them were in excess
of $3 million. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 727 (1977). Only 7% of the
plaintiffs, however, were able to state the cost of the concrete block used in their
construction projects. Id. at 727 n.6.
86. 67 F.R.D. at 463.
87. Id.
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the
burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to all material facts, and the
facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). See generally 6 MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 56.15[3] (1976). Additionally, the Supreme Court has cautioned that
summary judgment "should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation."
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); accord,
Donlan v. Carvel, 209 F. Supp. 829, 831 (D. Md. 1962).
89. 67 F.R.D. at 463-64.
90. Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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Although the district court rejected defendants' interpretation of
Hanover Shoe, it nonetheless granted summary judgment.91 In
reaching its decision, the court created a distinction between two
different types of indirect purchasers, 92 the "final consumer" 93 and
the "ultimate consumer." 94 Classifying the plaintiffs as "ultimate
consumers,' 95 the court concluded that "as to ultimate consumers,
their injuries are too remote and consequential to provide legal
standing to sue against the alleged antitrust violator. '96
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
employing the "target area" test,97 reversed in a unanimous
opinion.98 The court held that the plaintiffs, whether they be indirect
purchasers or ultimate consumers, had standing to maintain the
action on the ground that "they were within the area of the economy
which defendants reasonably could have or did foresee would be
endangered by the breakdown of competitive conditions." 99 The
court also held that the plaintiffs could recover treble damages if
they could prove that the overcharge was passed on to them through
the chain of distribution.100
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
between the third circuit's 1971 decision in Mangano,'0 and the
ninth circuit's decision in In Re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases.10 2 On
June 9, 1977, the Court by a six to three margin, 10 3 reversed the
91. 67 F.R.D. at 468.
92. Id. at 466-67. This -dichotomy was suggested by a legal commentator in
Comment, Mangano And Ultimate-Consumer Standing: The Misuse Of The
Hanover Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 394, 395 (1972).
93. Final consumer is one who "acquires the goods in the same condition as
originally made and sold by the manufacturer." Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67
F.R.D. 461, 466 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d 1163 (1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
94. Ultimate consumer is one "who obtains a finished product from a middleman
that has altered or added to the goods received from the manufacturer." Id.
95. The court's classification of the plaintiffs as "ultimate consumers" was based on
the fact that the concrete blocks were ultimately incorporated into buildings. The
court's application of a talismanic label, however, seems illusory, as a concrete
block is just as much a concrete block when it arrives at a construction site as it
is when it leaves the hands of the manufacturer.
96. 67 F.R.D. at 468 (emphasis in original).
97. The court also utilized the general standing test adopted by the Supreme Court in
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
See note 49 supra.
98. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
99. Id. at 1167 (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 1165.
101. See text accompanying notes 66-70 supra.
102. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nor. Standard Oil Co. v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 919 (1974) (indirect purchasers of asphalt who purchased through
contractors granted standing to sue suppliers for illegal overcharges passed on
through contractors).
103. In the majority were the Chief Justice and Justices White (author of the opinion),
Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens and Stewart. Justice Brennan authored a dissent, in
which Justices Blackmun and Marshall concurred. Justice Blackmun filed a
separate dissenting opinion.
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that the offensive use of
pass-on was not consistent with Hanover Shoe's restrictions on the
defensive use of pass-on. 10 4
B. Rationale Of The Decision
In speaking for the majority, Justice White offered three reasons
in support of the Court's holding that indirect purchasers may not
assert overcharges passed on to them through the chain of
distribution. First, consistency required the Court to follow Hanover
Shoe, and thus to hold direct purchasers to be injured to the full
extent of the overcharge. 05 Second, to allow the offensive use of
pass-on would create massive evidentiary problems that would
transform "treble-damage actions into massive efforts to apportion
the recovery among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed
part of the overcharge," and thereby "add whole new dimensions of
complexity to treble-damage suits. ' 06 Third, "allowing offensive but
not defensive use of pass-on would create a serious risk of multiple
liability for defendants.' 10 7
Justice White's second and third reasons reiterated concerns he
had expressed nine years earlier when speaking for a unanimous
court in Hanover Shoe. In. Hanover Shoe, he had been concerned
with the problems of proof inherent in the court's task of tracing the
effects of an illegal overcharge to direct purchasers on the prices
consumers ultimately paid. In Illinois Brick this concern over
problem' of proof had ripened into concern over the far greater
apportionment complexities that the offensive use of passing-on
would introduce. 108
The significant increase in antitrust litigation during the
interim may have been an underlying reason for the Court's
decision. The Illinois Brick majority was undoubtedly aware of, and
presumably alarmed by, the rapid expansion of treble-damages suits
and class actions, and the congested state of the lower courts'
dockets. 0 9 The Court may well have been motivated to stem the tide
104. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
105. Id. at 728.
106. Id. at 737.
107. Id. at 730.
108. See Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 637 (D. Colo. 1971) (district court
judge expressed concern that a class action by indirect purchasers "might be an
accountant's paradise, but it would be a court's purgatory").
109. Fiscal Year 1972 was the first year for which the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts compiled and tabulated statistics on class actions filed
under Federal Rule 23. As of June 30, 1972, pending civil antitrust class actions
totalled 308. See 1972 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Ann.
Rep. 189 (Table 54). Of those, 231 cases had been transferred under The
Multidistrict Litigation Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV 1974). By June 30,
1976, pending cases in this category totalled 471, and a year later, 514. See 1976
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Ann. Rep. 215 (Table 40), and
1977 Ann. Rep. 123 (Table 31). 1976 new filings totalled 190, and 1977 new filings
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of litigation, particularly in the vulnerable area of multiparty suits
involving complex problems of proof and allocation of damages. By
limiting the availability of the treble-damage remedy to direct
purchasers, both the size and numbers of classes would be reduced,
and the complex problems of proof, which involve tracing a
manufacturer's overcharge through the distribution chain and
allocating damages in protracted apportionment proceedings, would
be eliminated. The majority may have felt that such benefits
outweighed any negative impact the decision might have on
antitrust enforcement policy. 110
Justice White also remained convinced of the inequity of
exposing a defendant to pass-on claims asserted by indirect
purchasers while precluding the defendant from asserting a pass-on
defense; mutuality required that offensive passing-on be barred.111
He reasoned, moreover, that unless the treble-damage remedy was
restricted to direct purchasers, both a direct purchaser and a whole
series of indirect purchasers might recover treble damages for the
same illegal overcharge, and thus subject a defendant to multiple
liability.11 2 Unwilling to overrule Hanover Shoe, the majority opted
to reject pass-on claims and asserted that the antitrust laws would
be more effectively enforced by concentrating full recovery in the
direct purchaser.11 3
Although the Court distinguished between "the question of
which persons have been injured by an illegal overcharge for the
purposes of § 4" and a denial of standing,11 4 the decision in effect
denies standing to indirect purchasers, even though they have
actually been injured, by prohibiting them from asserting pass-on
claims. As a result, an indirect purchaser is now precluded from
proving his injury.
The majority opinion in Illinois Brick admittedly does not
demonstrate the same concern for consumer protection that had
been implicit in the Hanover Shoe Court's unanimous decision,
totalled 235, for a one year percentage increase of 23.68%, as calculated by the
author. The percentage increase over the five year period 1972-1977 was 66.88%,
which figure correlates closely with the 68% increase in treble-damage suits
during the 1970-1977 period. See text accompanying notes 9 and 10 supra.
110. See 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 875 (1977), wherein the author describes the impact of
Illinois Brick on the scheme of enforcement envisioned by Congress as
anomolous, and says that the decision cannot be rationalized within the
framework of traditional antitrust enforcement policy.
111. 431 U.S. 720, 728-35 (1977). Neither Hanover Shoe nor Illinois Brick, by
themselves or read together, completely reject either offensive or defensive use of
passing-on. See Note, Recovery by Indirect Purchasers and the Functions of
Antitrust Treble Damages, 55 TExAs L. REV. 1445 (1977) (contains thoughtful
and cogent analysis of Illinois Brick, and discusses narrow exceptions to Court's
general prohibition of passing-on).
112. 431 U.S. at 730-31.
113. Id. at 745-47.
114. Id. at 728 n.7.
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which Justice White left for Justice Brennan to express on behalf of
the minority.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan condemned the Court's
decision to limit the treble-damages remedy only to persons who
purchase directly from an antitrust violator as a "regrettable
retreat" from the broad objectives of compensation and deterrence
set out in section 4 of the Clayton Act.1 15 He criticized the majority's
radical departure from its long-standing policy of encouraging
vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust laws, 116 and chided the
majority for disregarding the Court's past warnings against adding
"requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is
specifically set forth by Congress in the antitrust laws."' 17 He
pointed out that our economic system is largely based upon a chain
of distribution, and that the Court's decision "severely undermines
the effectiveness of the private treble-damages action as an
instrument of antitrust enforcement.""l 8 Justice Brennan asserted
that direct purchasers who act as middlemen would not want to
jeopardize their business relations with their suppliers by suing
them, so long as the middlemen could pass on the illegal overcharges
to others in the chain of distribution. 19 By precluding an indirect
consumer, who actually suffers, from maintaining suit, antitrust
violators would go unpunished and victims would remain uncompen-
sated.
Justice Brennan regarded the estimation of the overcharge
passed on to an indirect purchaser, and the amount of his damage,
which so concerned Justice White, as being no different and no more
complicated than estimating what the middleman's selling price
would have been absent the violation.' 20 He also discounted the risk
of multiple liability, stating that existing procedural mechanisms
were sufficient virtually to eliminate that danger,' 2' and contended
that there were "sound reasons for treating offensive and defensive
passing-on cases differently."' 122 Justice Blackmun, concurring in the
Brennan dissent, decried as a "wooden approach" the majority's
insistence on consistency with Hanover Shoe. Justice Blackmun
viewed Hanover Shoe as compelling a conclusion in favor of indirect
purchasers who could demonstrate injury. 23
115. Id. at 748-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 755-56 (quoting Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454
(1957)).
118. Id. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. Id.
120. Id. at 758-59.
121. Id. at 761.
122. Id. at 753.




Although the decision in Hanover Shoe showed a greater
concern for enforcement of the antitrust laws, the Illinois Brick
decision was equally pragmatic. In Illinois Brick, the court adhered
to the rationale of Hanover Shoe, both in permitting direct
purchasers to recover and in rejecting offensive passing-on as
inconsistent with the restrictions imposed by Hanover Shoe on
defensive passing-on. It found mutuality preferable to the myriad
procedural problems it foresaw if a contrary result were reached.
There is a certain parallelism between Illinois Brick and Loeb v.
Eastman Kodak Co. 124 Justice White's concern over multiplicity of
suits echoes the Loeb court's concern. The "direct dealing"
requirement to show injury and therefore standing to sue is
reminiscent of the "direct-injury" test first enunciated in Loeb sixty-
seven years earlier and the privity requirement developed through
subsequent cases. The "target area" test of standing to sue is
rejected, despite its apparent acceptance by the Perkins Court only
eight years earlier. 125
It seems likely that Congress may accept Justice White's
invitation to amend section 4 of the Clayton Act, if it disagrees with
the result in Illinois Brick.126 Bills have been introduced in both the
House of Representatives 27 and the Senate128 to amend section 4 of
the Clayton Act to permit recovery by indirect consumers. Unless
such corrective legislation is enacted, it would appear that the
availability to consumers of the treble-damages remedy has been
severely curtailed.
William F. Ryan, Jr.
124. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
125. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
126. 431 U.S. 720, 733-34 n.14 (1977).
127. H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
128. S. 1874, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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